Research

My research statement is here and a summary of my research can be found here 

Publications 

Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary for a broader audience: AEA highlights, VoxDev, JPAL (video)

Income Concentration in British India, 1885-1946 with Facundo Alvaredo and Guilhem Cassan, Journal of Development Economics, 2017, 127.

The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014 with  Raj Chetty,  Micheal Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Ben Scuderi , Nick Turner and David Cutler, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 2016, 315(14).

Working Papers

 The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC 

Summary for a broader audience: Econimate (video), VoxDev, JPAL (video), JPAL, World Bank 

Abstract: This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low-income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue-maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one-third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We exploit two sources of variation in enforcement— randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors — to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement.  Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue-maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.

Optimal Assignment of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the DRC 

Summary for a broader audience: VoxDev

Abstract: The assignment of workers to tasks and teams is a key margin of firm productivity and a potential source of state effectiveness. This paper investigates whether a low-capacity state can increase its tax revenue by optimally assigning its tax collectors. We study the two-stage random assignment of property tax collectors into teams and to neighborhoods in a large Congolese city. The optimal assignment involves positive assortative matching on both dimensions: high (low) ability collectors should be paired together, and high (low) ability teams should be paired with high (low) payment propensity households. Positive assortative matching stems from complementarities in collector-to-collector and collector-to-household match types. We provide evidence that these complementarities reflect in part high-ability collectors exerting greater effort when matched with other high-ability collectors. According to our estimates, implementing the optimal assignment would increase tax compliance by 2.94 percentage points and revenue by 26% relative to the status quo (random) assignment. Alternative policies, such as replacing low-ability collectors with new ones of average ability or increasing collectors’ performance wages, are likely incapable of achieving a similar revenue increase.

Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the D.R.C

Abstract: Delegating tax collection to informal leaders could raise tax revenue but runs the risk of undermining the local accountability of those leaders. We investigate this tradeoff by exploiting whether city chiefs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were randomly assigned to collect property taxes in 2018. To measure accountability, we study the other side of the social contract: chiefs' distribution of resources in a government cash transfer program in which they had discretion over the recipients of development aid. In line with citizens' preferences, chiefs who collected taxes allocated more program benefits to poorer households and thus made fewer inclusion and exclusion errors. They were no more or less likely to pocket benefits or allocate them to family. Across a range of measures, citizens appear to have updated positively about chiefs who collected taxes. We provide evidence that collector chiefs allocated aid to poorer households because door-to-door tax collection created opportunities to learn which households were in greatest need. In contrast to concerns of `decentralized despotism,' the paper thus finds evidence of accountability benefits from delegating tax responsibilities to local leaders in low-capacity states.

Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Experimental Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: While past scholarship finds that taxation catalyzes citizen participation, little is known about whether the delegation of tax collection to local non-state actors---a common practice in developing countries---undermines demand for accountability directed at the state. We examine a policy experiment in which 101 neighborhoods in Kananga, D.R. Congo, were randomly assigned to property tax collection by state agents or local city chiefs. We combine this source of variation with a novel behavioral measure of collective action in which 2,631 citizens could request community audits of an antipoverty program implemented jointly by the government and city chiefs. We find no evidence that the type of agent in charge of tax collection differentially affected citizens' propensity to hold the state or chief accountable. The results indicate that low-capacity states can raise revenue by delegating tax collection to local leaders in urban areas without adverse consequences for bottom-up accountability.

Zero-sum Thinking, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development

Abstract: We study the evolution of belief systems that suppress productive effort, including beliefs about envy, the importance of luck for success, witchcraft beliefs, and disdain for competitive effort. Demotivating beliefs evolve when interactions are zero-sum. They improve short-run material welfare by limiting excessive competition but reduce long-run growth. Demotivating beliefs also drive a wedge between how well people do and how well they think they do. Whereas material welfare is hump-shaped in demotivating beliefs, subjective well-being is decreasing. These predictions are supported by data from two samples in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the World Values Survey.

Property Rights and Social Institutions: How Informal Institutions and Chiefs Shape Land Formalization in Urban Africa

Abstract: Formalization always takes place against a backdrop of social institutions. Yet, whether social institutions are an asset or a constraint for formalization remains unclear. We argue that, when offered the opportunity to formalize their land, citizens weigh the benefits of informal insurance against the obligations and costs of social institutions. We study a randomized land titling program in a large Congolese city that caused a substantial increase in the demand for and acquisition of land titles. Demand for formalization was more pronounced among citizens who participated more in social institutions and had closer links to city chiefs. In turn, the program crowded out participation in social institutions and worsened citizens’ perceptions of chiefs. These results challenge the view that social institutions are an effective substitute for formal land property rights in urban Africa.

Fiscal Contracts? A Six-Country Randomized Experiment on Transaction Costs, Public Services, and Taxation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

Abstract:  We present results from six randomized controlled trials jointly designed to promote state-citizens transactions, in which citizens abide by a particular regulation or gain formal access to a public service in exchange for becoming “legible” to the state and liable for taxes. Each randomized intervention aimed to reduce the up-front costs of transacting with the state with in-person visits, during which citizens received information about the government benefits that come with one of three types of formalization (business registration, property titling, and access to a public service) and assistance in undertaking the bureaucratic process to formalize. A meta-analysis shows that the average effect of these interventions on citizens’ intent to formalize, on formalization, and tax payment is indistinguishable from zero. We also find substantial heterogeneity across sites in the interventions’ effect on individuals’ intent to formalize and actual formalization, which suggests that there are both demand- and supply-side barriers to formalization. The results shed light on central questions about the plausibility of establishing a fiscal contract in which governments trade tax payments for public benefits and services in low- and middle-income countries.

Missions, Social Ties, and Moral Universalism: Evidence from the Belgian Congo 

Abstract: I study the effect of historical exposure to Christian missions in the Belgian Congo on family and ethnic ties. I use archival records to identify the location of colonial missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and combine them with contemporary data collected from surveys, social network questionnaires, and a lab-in-the-field job referral experiment. Examining a sample of 975 respondents, I find that historical exposure to Christian missions results in less family and coethnic bias today. Missions are also associated with fewer family members and coethnics in respondents' social networks or recommended for a job in the referral experiment. Relatedly, exposure to missions is associated with less communal moral values and more universal values. I use two approaches to address the potential bias introduced by the endogenous location of missions. First, I compare actual missions to missions that were ultimately abandoned. Abandoned missions were located in sites with similar geographic and historical characteristics but did not affect ethnic and family ties or moral values. Second, I compare actual missions to counterfactual locations that would have been similarly suitable for missions. Counterfactual mission locations do not seem to have affected ethnic and family ties or moral values. I use data on mission characteristics to show that the effects operate through exposure to religious figures and teachers. 

Work In Progress

State Building via Punitive and Restorative Justice: Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: Resolving disputes is integral to the accumulation of state capacity. Yet policymakers often privilege fiscal capacity building in fragile states over legal capacity building. In this project, we study a low-capacity state—the D.R. Congo—seeking to establish legal authority and how its efforts to do so shape citizens’ demand for the state. Specifically, we examine the randomized rollout of a legal capacity-building program implemented at scale in the city of Kananga (DRC) by the Ministry of Justice and a local NGO. This program has (1) a “punitive” legal capacity-building arm in which state lawyers serve as neighborhood legal representatives with subsidized services and (2) a “restorative” legal capacity-building arm in which customary chiefs perform these same functions. We will examine effects on property rights security, crime, violence, and citizens’ willingness to pay for the formal state. 

Progressivity, Fairness, and Tax Capacity: Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: The innovation of progressive taxation in the early 20th century accompanied some of the largest increases in tax revenue in Europe and the US and is a core feature of most tax systems in today’s developed countries. In developing countries, however, states often use simplified tax instruments that are comparatively much more regressive. This project will explore the randomized introduction of progressive property taxation in the D.R. Congo, a low-income country with weak fiscal capacity. In collaboration with the Provincial Government of Kasaï-Central, our evaluation will compare neighborhoods in the city of Kananga assigned to either the existing flat fee schedule (control), a proportional tax rate schedule (treatment 1), or a schedule of progressive property tax rates (treatment 2). We will study effects on total revenue, household compliance, and perceptions of fairness and tax morale to inform the design at scale of a tax schedule that balances revenue and fairness.

Political Consequences of Perceived Inequality Across Ethno-Religious Groups: Experimental Evidence from Lebanon

Abstract: Income inequalities have risen starkly across the globe in recent decades. Yet societies worldwide are increasingly organized along ethno-religious lines rather than economic ones. This puzzle is particularly true of Lebanon, where ethno-religious voting blocs continue to uphold a failed state. To explore this, we will first conduct a representative survey of 3,300 Lebanese living in Greater Beirut to document the relationship between incorrect beliefs about out-groups and support for sectarianism — the formal and informal organization of life around religious sect. We then conduct an experiment to test the effects of correcting the misperceptions in particular – “they are better off than us” and “they would not challenge the status quo” — on political preferences and participation. We randomly assign respondents to a video treatment stressing the relatively low levels of inequality between religious groups (treatment 1), the high rates of discontent with the sectarian status quo across religious groups (treatment 2), both videos combined (treatment 1 and 2), or a placebo (control). We test whether correcting beliefs can bolster social cohesion, shape policy preferences on redistribution, tax morale, and the acceptability of voting for politicians from other religions, and boost real-world measures of political and civic participation.