Research

My research statement is here and a summary of my research can be found here 

Publications 

 The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC 

Summary for a broader audience: Econimate (video), VoxDev, JPAL (video), JPAL, World Bank

Abstract: This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low‐income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue‐maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one‐third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sources of variation in enforcement—randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors—to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue‐maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.

Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary for a broader audience: AEA highlights, VoxDev, JPAL (video)

Abstract: This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them.

Income Concentration in British India, 1885-1946 with Facundo Alvaredo and Guilhem Cassan, Journal of Development Economics, 2017, 127.

The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014 with  Raj Chetty,  Micheal Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Ben Scuderi , Nick Turner and David Cutler, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 2016, 315(14).

Working Papers

Supermodular Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the DRC 

Summary for a broader audience: VoxDev

Abstract: The assignment of workers to tasks and teams is a key margin of firm productivity and a potential source of state effectiveness. This paper investigates whether a low-capacity state can increase its tax revenue by improving the assignment of its tax collectors. We study the two-stage random assignment of property tax collectors into teams and to neighborhoods in a large Congolese city. The optimal assignment involves positive assortative matching on both dimensions: high (low) ability collectors should be paired together, and high (low) ability teams should be paired with high (low) payment propensity households. Positive assortative matching stems from complementarities in collector-to-collector and collector-to-household match types. We provide evidence that these complementarities reflect in part high-ability collectors exerting greater effort when matched with other high-ability collectors. According to our estimates, implementing the optimal assignment would increase tax compliance by 3.75 percentage points and revenue by 38% relative to the status quo (random) assignment. Alternative policies, such as replacing low-ability collectors with new ones of average ability or increasing collectors' performance wages, are likely incapable of achieving a similar revenue increase.

Zero-sum Environments, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development

Abstract: We study the evolution of belief systems that suppress productive effort, including beliefs about envy, the importance of luck for success, witchcraft beliefs, and disdain for competitive effort. Demotivating beliefs evolve when interactions are zero-sum. They improve short-run material welfare by limiting excessive competition but reduce long-run growth. Demotivating beliefs also drive a wedge between how well people do and how well they think they do. Whereas material welfare is hump-shaped in demotivating beliefs, subjective well-being is decreasing. These predictions are supported by data from two samples in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the World Values Survey.

Colonial Missions and the Long-Term Transformation of Social Ties: Evidence from the Belgian Congo

Abstract: This paper studies whether colonial interventions fundamentally reshaped social structures by altering how individuals form and prioritize social ties. I examine the long-term impact of Christian missions, which sought to replace indigenous kinship and authority systems with European and Christian models of social organization. Combining newly digitized archival data on historical mission locations with original survey, social network, and experimental data from 975 respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I find that exposure to missions persistently weakened family and coethnic bias, reconfigured social networks away from kinship ties, and reoriented individual identity from ethnicity and family toward religion. These effects are accompanied by an erosion of communal moral values. To address potential endogeneity in mission placement, I construct two counterfactuals: abandoned missions that were initially established but later closed, and simulated locations that were suitable for missions but not selected. Comparisons with these counterfactuals provide causal evidence that exposure to missions persistently reshaped social structures, identities, and moral values. Finally, historical data on mission personnel and infrastructure suggest that religious instruction and education were key mechanisms. These findings highlight the enduring role of colonial institutions in transforming the deep structure of social cohesion in postcolonial societies.

Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Responsiveness of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the D.R.C

Abstract: In weak states, delegating tax collection to informal leaders may raise revenue but risks undermining their responsiveness to local preferences. We investigate this tradeoff by exploiting whether city chiefs in D.R. Congo were randomly assigned to collect property taxes. To measure responsiveness, we study the other side of the social contract: chiefs' distribution of resources in a government cash transfer program in which they had discretion over the recipients of development aid. In line with citizens' preferences, chiefs who collected taxes allocated more program benefits to poorer households and thus made fewer inclusion and exclusion errors. They were no more or less likely to pocket benefits or allocate them to family. Across a range of measures, citizens appear to have updated positively about chiefs who collected taxes. We provide evidence that collector chiefs allocated aid to poorer households because door-to-door tax collection created opportunities to learn which households were in greatest need. The results help allay concerns about the effects of chief tax collection on local governance and highlight a synergy between the information needed by low-capacity states for taxation and for transfers.

Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Experimental Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: While past scholarship finds that taxation catalyzes citizen participation, little is known about whether the delegation of tax collection to local non-state actors -- a common practice in developing countries - undermines demand for accountability directed at the state. We examine a policy experiment in which 101 neighborhoods in Kananga, D.R. Congo, were randomly assigned to property tax collection by state agents or local city chiefs. We combine this source of variation with a novel behavioral measure of collective action in which 2,631 citizens could request community audits of an antipoverty program implemented jointly by the government and city chiefs. We find no evidence that the type of agent in charge of tax collection differentially affected citizens' propensity to hold the state or chief accountable. The results indicate that low-capacity states can raise revenue by delegating tax collection to local leaders in urban areas without adverse consequences for bottom-up accountability.

Property Rights and Social Institutions: How Local Institutions and Chiefs Shape Land Formalization in Urban Africa

Abstract: Formalization always takes place against a backdrop of social institutions. Yet, whether social institutions are an asset or a constraint for formalization remains unclear. We argue that, when offered the opportunity to formalize their land, citizens weigh the benefits of informal insurance against the obligations and costs of social institutions. We study a randomized land titling program in a large Congolese city that caused a substantial increase in the demand for and acquisition of land titles. Demand for formalization was more pronounced among citizens who participated more in social institutions and had closer links to city chiefs. In turn, the program crowded out participation in social institutions and worsened citizens’ perceptions of chiefs. These results challenge the view that social institutions are an effective substitute for formal land property rights in urban Africa.

Fiscal Contracts? A Six-Country Randomized Experiment on Transaction Costs, Public Services, and Taxation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

Abstract:  We present results from six randomized controlled trials jointly designed to promote state-citizens transactions, in which citizens abide by a particular regulation or gain formal access to a public service in exchange for becoming “legible” to the state and liable for taxes. Each randomized intervention aimed to reduce the up-front costs of transacting with the state with in-person visits, during which citizens received information about the government benefits that come with one of three types of formalization (business registration, property titling, and access to a public service) and assistance in undertaking the bureaucratic process to formalize. A meta-analysis shows that the average effect of these interventions on citizens’ intent to formalize, on formalization, and tax payment is indistinguishable from zero. We also find substantial heterogeneity across sites in the interventions’ effect on individuals’ intent to formalize and actual formalization, which suggests that there are both demand- and supply-side barriers to formalization. The results shed light on central questions about the plausibility of establishing a fiscal contract in which governments trade tax payments for public benefits and services in low- and middle-income countries.

Work In Progress

Progressivity, Fairness, and Tax Capacity: Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: The introduction of progressive taxation in the early 20th century accompanied some of the largest increases in tax revenue in Europe and the United States, and progressive taxation remains a cornerstone of most tax systems in today’s developed economies. In many developing countries, however, governments often rely on simplified tax instruments that are considerably more regressive. This project evaluates the randomized introduction of progressive property taxation in the D.R. Congo, a low-income country with weak fiscal capacity. In partnership with the Provincial Government of Kasaï-Central, we randomly assign neighborhoods in the city of Kananga to one of three property tax schedules: a flat fee schedule (control), a proportional tax rate schedule (treatment 1), or a progressive tax rate schedule (treatment 2). We study the effects on tax compliance, tax revenue, perceptions of fairness, and tax morale, providing evidence to inform the design of property tax systems that balance revenue generation and equity in low-capacity settings. 

State Building via Punitive and Restorative Justice: Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: Resolving disputes is integral to the accumulation of state capacity. Yet policymakers often privilege fiscal capacity building in fragile states over legal capacity building. In this project, we study a low-capacity state—the D.R. Congo—seeking to establish legal authority and how its efforts to do so shape citizens’ demand for the state. Specifically, we examine the randomized rollout of a legal capacity-building program implemented at scale in the city of Kananga (DRC) by the Ministry of Justice and a local NGO. This program has (1) a “punitive” legal capacity-building arm in which state lawyers serve as neighborhood legal representatives with subsidized services and (2) a “restorative” legal capacity-building arm in which customary chiefs perform these same functions. We will examine effects on property rights security, crime, violence, and citizens’ willingness to pay for the formal state. 

Misperceptions  of Inequality and Sectarian Politics: Experimental Evidence from Lebanon

Abstract: Income inequality has risen sharply in recent decades, yet many societies remain politically organized around ethno-religious rather than economic class identities. In Lebanon, sectarian voting blocs continue to dominate despite state failure and mounting economic hardship. This project investigates whether misconceptions about the relative economic conditions of other religious groups — particularly beliefs that these groups are economically better off — help sustain this pattern. In a representative survey of 3,300 Lebanese citizens in Beirut, we randomly assign participants to watch a short video presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence that all major religious groups in Lebanon face similarly severe economic challenges. We examine whether this intervention reduces support for sectarian politics, strengthens identification with the poor across religious lines, and increases support for pro-poor, redistributive policies.